The thrust of the research is the following. The sudden ascent of the Taliban to power in the early 1990s is often ascribed to the military strategy and the material assistance from neighboring countries but less to the popular acclaim the Taliban enjoyed at the outset. It is the latter that the research intends to dwell on. The research first argues that the Taliban could not have thrived without the particular circumstance in which the movement found fertile soil. It considers the Taliban as "an indigenous, situational and reactional phenomenon" of the Afghan society as adequately coined by a professor of Peshawar University and less as an external entity concocted in the radicalized madrassas of the refugee camps in Pakistan. A Taliban spokesman once likened Afghanistan to a mirror image of the world: "If you do not like your image in the mirror, don't break the mirror but break your face." Similarly, the Afghan society is reflected in the Taliban movement, which cannot be dissociated from the former.
The decade-long Soviet occupation and the armed resistance left a destructive impact on life and property of the population just to be followed by another devastating period of internecine fighting among warlords. Accordingly, the understanding as to what constitutes an ideal leader also changed with the course of events. After a long period of hereditary successions of royal authority, political legitimacy came to be bestowed on those who vowed to defend religious values and resist Soviet occupation. After the Soviet withdrawal, anybody who managed to disarm the marauding warlords and to ensure security was hailed as a redeemer. Not surprisingly, the manifesto of the Taliban to restore law and order based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law resonated with many Afghans. The "peace in the graveyard" under the Taliban regime was still to be preferred to the previous period of chaos and lawlessness.
After the ousting of the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2001, the introduction of presidential democracy based on popular vote and recognition of Afghanistan as a full-fledged member of the international community represented a challenge to the previous way how legitimacy was defined and acquired. The Taliban pilloried the weakness of the Karzai government and started an insurgency against the coalition forces. They evoked Jihad and let revive the old label of Mujahideen (freedom fighter) with the hope of gaining the same level of legitimacy the members used to be bestowed. The difference today, however, is that armed struggle no longer coincides with what is considered legitimate by the so-called community of liberal states. Today, recognition is granted to those who effectively protects their own population from physical threat, provide social service, and elevates their general standard of living.
Against this backdrop, the Taliban is obdurately sandwiched between the old way of acquiring legitimacy through armed struggle and the new reality of legitimacy associated with responsible government. In the course of interaction with its own fighters and international community, the Taliban is undergoing an identity split; to its own members, the Taliban articulates the old rhetoric of Jihad against the invading non-believers, whereas to the external community it alludes to complying with international and humanitarian norms. Nothing exemplifies better than the Taliban's Code of Conduct, which I attempt to illustrate with a model termed the "one-way mirror." It is open to interpretation whether the Taliban's response is an outcome of bedeviled soul-searching or of a cool-minded calculated strategy. What can be at least inferred is that the double-pronged rhetoric is used consistently throughout Afghanistan and that this insight leads to new hints and reflection on how to deal with the current insurgency in Afghanistan.
More than a decade has passed since the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan made its appearance and since the Coalition Forces became entangled in a long and protracted war. Now, the international forces begin to withdraw from Afghanistan and the world attention is on the armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Again, Afghanistan is on the verge of falling into oblivion reminiscent of the times when the Soviet forces withdrew and when the world was transfixed by the wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia. On the other hand, the withdrawal from Afghanistan may also represent an opportunity, as the international community has become more susceptible to alternative solutions other than kinetic ones. In search for a less costly and sustainable solution in Afghanistan, a thorough reality check and analysis of the political dynamics, the insurgency, and the coalition's response are primordial-and this book hopes to make a modest contribution in this regard.
The reader may forgive me for the academic tone of the book as it was conducted in the framework of PhD dissertation at the University of Tokyo. In order to make the book readable to a wide audience, utmost care was paid to omit academic jargon and keep theory to the minimum. The opinions stated in the following research are those of the researcher alone and do not reflect the views of any of his organizations. All interviews used herein were conducted in the private capacity of the author.
Last but not least, I cannot hide my surreptitious wish that this book is read, commented, and reflected upon by the Taliban members themselves. After all, a sustainable solution in Afghanistan can only be found with the inclusion of all stakeholders, including, whether we like it or not, the Afghan Taliban.
Tokyo November 2014
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